T h e   T h e o l o g y   o f   P l a t o
       b y   P r o c l u s

    T H E   F I R S T   P R I N C I P L E

    The twofold division to all things

       If, however, it be requisite to survey each of the dogmas about it which are scattered in the writings of Plato, and to reduce them to one science of theology, let us consider, if you are willing, prior to other things, what Socrates demonstrates in the 6th book of the Republic, conformably to the before mentioned mode, and how through analogy he teaches us the wonderful transcendency of The Good with respect to all beings, and the summits of the whole of things. 
       In the first place therefore, he distinguishes beings from each other, and establishing some of them to be intelligibles, but others sensibles, he defines science by the knowledge of beings. 
     

    intelligible beings
    sensible beings
    Science is the knowledge of intelligible and sensible beings

       But he conjoins sense with sensibles, and giving a twofold division to all things, he places one exempt monad over intelligible multitude, and a second monad over sensible multitude, according to a similitude to the former monad. 
     

    intelligible monad
    intelligible multitude
    sensible monad
    sensible multitude
    The twofold division to all things

       Of these monads also, he shows that the one is generative of intelligible light, but the other of sensible light. 
     

    intelligible monad
    generative of
    intelligible light
    intelligible multitude
    sensible monad
    generative of
    sensible light
    sensible multitude
    Both monads are generative of light

       And he evinces that by the intelligible light indeed, all intelligibles are deiform, and boniform, according to participation from the first God; but that by the sensible light, according to the perfection derived from the sun, all sensible natures are solarform, and similar to their one monad. 
     

    intelligible monad
     
    intelligible multitude
    all intelligibles are deiform and boniform
    sensible monad
     
    sensible multitude
    all sensible natures are solarform
    Each nature is similar to their one monad

       In addition also to what has been said, he suspends the second monad from that which reigns in the intelligible. And thus he extends all things, both the first and the last of beings, I mean intelligibles and sensibles, to The Good. 
     

    The Good = intelligible monad
    intelligible multitude
    the sun = sensible monad
    sensible multitude
    All things are extended to The Good

       Such a mode of reduction to the first as this, appears to me to be most excellent, and especially adapted to theology; viz. to congregate all the Gods in the world into one union, and suspend them from their proximate monad; but to refer the supermundane Gods to the intellectual kingdom; to suspend the intellectual Gods from intelligible union; and to refer the intelligible Gods themselves, and all beings through these, to that which is first. 
     

    intelligible kingdom
    intelligible monad
    intelligible Gods
    intellectual kingdom
    intellectual monad
    intellectual Gods
    supermundane kingdom
    supermundane monad
    supermundane Gods
    mundane kingdom
    mundane monad
    mundane Gods

       For as the monad of mundane natures is supermundane, as the monad of supermundane natures is intellectual, and of intellectual natures intelligible, thus also it is necessary that first intelligibles should be suspended from the monad which is above intelligibles and perfected by it, and being filled with deity, should illuminate secondary natures with intelligible light. 
       But it is necessary that intellectual natures which derive the enjoyment of their being from intelligibles, but of good and a uniform hyparxis from the first cause, should connect supermundane natures by intellectual light. And that the genera of the Gods prior to the world, through receiving a pure intellect from the intellectual Gods, but intelligible light from the intelligible Gods, and a unical light from the father of the whole of things, should send into this apparent world the illumination of the light which they possess. 
       In this account, the sun being the summit of mundane natures, and proceeding from the etherial profundities, imparts to visible natures supernatural perfection, and causes these as much as possible to be similar to the supercelestial worlds. These things therefore we shall afterwards more abundantly discuss. 

    What is sensible is splendid because it imitates the primogenial cause of itself

       The present discourse, however, suspends all things after the above mentioned manner from The Good, and the first unity. For if indeed the sun connects every thing sensible, but The Good produces and perfects every thing intelligible, and of these, the second monad [i. e. the sun] is denominated the offspring of The Good and on this account causes that which is sensible to be splendid, and adorns and fills it with good, because it imitates the primogenial cause of itself, - if this be the case, all things will thus participate of the good, and will be extended to this one principle, intelligibles indeed, and the most divine of beings without a medium, but sensibles through their monad [the sun]. 

    Some things are intelligibles and others are sensibles, but the summits of them are uniformly established in intelligibles

       Again therefore, and after another manner, Plato narrates to us in this extract from the Republic the analysis to the first principle. For he suspends all the multitudes in the world from the intelligible monads, as for instance, all beautiful things from the beautiful itself, all good things from The Good, and all equal things from the equal itself. And again, he considers some things as intelligibles, but others as sensibles; but the summits of them are uniformly established in intelligibles. 
     

    intelligibles
    the beautiful itself
    The Good
    the equal itself
    sensibles
    all beautiful things
    all good things
    all equal things
     All the multitudes in the world are suspended from the intelligible monads

       Again, from these intelligible forms he thinks fit to ascend still higher, and venerating in a greater degree the goodness which is beyond intelligibles, he apprehends that all intelligibles, and the monads which they contain, subsist and are perfected through it. For as we refer the sensible multitude to a monad unco-ordinated with sensibles, and we think that through this monad the multitude of sensibles derives its subsistence, so it is necessary to refer the intelligible multitude to another cause which is not connumerated with intelligibles, and from which they are allotted their essence and their divine hyparxis.

    The first good is not only the cause of what is good, but similarly of things beautiful

       Let not, however, any one fancy that Plato admits there is the same order of The Good in intelligible forms, as there is prior to intelligibles. But the good indeed, which is co-ordinated with the beautiful, must be considered as essential, and as one of the forms which are in intelligibles.
     

     
    The Good
    intelligibles
    the beautiful itself
    the good itself
    sensibles
    all beautiful things
    all good things
     There is not the same order of The Good in intelligible forms

       For the first good, which by conjoining the article with the noun we are accustomed to call The Good, is admitted to be something superessential, and more excellent than all beings both in dignity and power; since Socrates also, when discussing the beautiful and the good, calls the one the beautiful itself and the other the good itself, and thus says he we must denominate all the things which we then very properly considered as many. 
       Again, particularly considering each thing as being one, we denominate each thing that which it is, and thus Socrates leading us from sensible things that are beautiful and good, and in short from things that are participated, subsist in other things, and are multiplied, to the superessential unities of intelligibles and the first essences, from these again, he transfers us to the exempt cause of every thing beautiful and good. 
       For in forms, the beautiful itself is the leader of many beautiful things, and the good itself of many goods, and each form alone gives subsistence to things similar to itself. But the first good is not only the cause of what is good, but similarly of things beautiful, as Plato elsewhere says; and "all things are for its sake, and it is the cause of every thing beautiful."

    The Good prior to forms is beyond beings, and is established above all knowledge

       For again, in addition to what has been said, the good which is in forms is intelligible and known, as Socrates himself teaches; but The Good prior to forms is beyond beings, and is established above all knowledge. And the former is the source of essential perfection; but the latter is the supplier of good to the Gods so far as they are Gods, and is generative of goods which are prior to essences. 
     

    The Good
    prior to forms
    is beyond beings
    is established above all knowledge
    is generative of goods which are prior to essences
    the good
    which is in forms
    is intelligible
    is known
    is the source of essential perfection

       We must not therefore apprehend that when Socrates calls the first principle The Good, from the name of idea, that he directly calls it the intelligible goodness; but though the first principle is superior to all language and appellation, we permit Socrates to call it the cause of every thing beautiful and good, transferring through the things which are proximately filled by it, appellations to it. 
       For this I think Socrates indicating asserts in all that he says about The Good, that it is beyond knowledge and things that are known, and likewise beyond essence and being, according to its analogy to the sun. And after a certain admirable manner he presents us with an epitome of the negations of The One in the Parmenides. 
       For the assertion that The Good is neither truth, nor essence, nor intellect, nor science, at one and the same time separates it from the superessential unities, and every genus of the Gods, and from the intellectual and intelligible orders, and from every psychical subsistence. But these are the first things, and through the first hypothesis of the Parmenides, these are taken away from the principle of the whole of things. 

    The first light proceeds from The Good as the fountain of every intelligible, or intellectual, or mundane deity

       Moreover, neither when he celebrates The Good the leader of the divine orders, as the most splendid of being, does he denominate it most splendid as participating of light. For the first light proceeds from it to intelligibles and intellect, but he gives it this appellation as the cause of the light which is every where diffused, and as the fountain of every intelligible, or intellectual, or mundane deity. 
     

    The Good
     intelligible Gods
     intellectual Gods
    mundane Gods
    The Good is the leader of the divine orders

       For this light is nothing else than the participation of a divine hyparxis. For as all things become boniform through participating of The Good and are filled with the illumination proceeding from thence, thus also the natures which are primarily beings are deiform; and as it is said, intelligible and intellectual essences become divine through the participation of deity. 
       Looking therefore to all that has been said, we shall preserve the exempt transcendency of The Good with reference to all beings and the divine orders. But again, in each order of beings, we must grant that there is a monad analogous to it, not only in sensibles, as Plato says the sun is, but likewise in supermundane natures, and in the genera of Gods arranged from The Good prior to these. 
     

    intelligible order
    The Good
    intelligible Gods
    intellectual order
    intellectual monad
    intellectual Gods
    supermundane order
    supermundane monad
    supermundane Gods
    mundane order
    mundane monad
    mundane Gods
    In each order of beings there is a monad

       For it is evident that the natures which are nearer to the first cause and which participate of it in a greater degree, possess a greater similitude to it. And as that is the cause of all beings, so these establish monads which are the leaders of more partial orders. And Plato indeed arranges the multitudes under the monads; but extends all the monads to the exempt principle of the whole of things, and establishes them uniformly about it. 
       It is necessary therefore that the theological science should be unfolded conformably to the divine orders, and that our conceptions about it should be transcendent, and unmingled and unconnected with other things. And we should survey indeed all secondary natures, subsisting according to and perfected about it; but we should establish it as transcending all the monads in beings, according to one excess of simplicity, and as unically arranged prior to the whole orders [of Gods.] For as the Gods themselves enact the order which is in them, thus also it is necessary that the truth concerning them, the precedaneous causes of beings, and the second and third progeny of these should be definitely distinguished. 

    The first principle gives subsistence to the boniform essence of the Gods

       This, therefore, is the one truth concerning the first principle, and which possesses one reason remarkably conformable to the Platonic hypothesis, viz. that this principle subsists prior to the whole orders in the Gods, that it gives subsistence to the boniform essence of the Gods, that it is the fountain of superessential goodness, and that all things posterior to it being extended towards it, are filled with good, after an ineffable manner are united to it, and subsist uniformly about it. 
     

    the first principle
    subsists prior to the whole orders in the Gods
    gives subsistence to the boniform essence of the Gods
    is the fountain of superessential goodness
    all things posterior to it being extended towards it, are filled with good, after an ineffable manner are united to it, and subsist uniformly about it
    The one truth concerning the first principle

       For its unical nature is not unprolific, but it is by so much the more generative of other things, as it pre-establishes a union exempt from the things which have a subsistence. Nor does its fecundity tend to multitude and division; but it abides with undefiled purity concealed in inaccessible places. For in the natures also which are posterior to it, we every where see that what is perfect desires to generate, and that what is full hastens to impart to other things its plenitude. 
       In a much greater degree therefore it is necessary that the nature which contains in one all perfections, and which is not a certain good, but good itself, and super-full, (if it be lawful so to speak) should be generative of the whole of things, and give subsistence to them; producing all things by being exempt from all things, and by being imparticipable, similarly generating the first and the last of beings. 

    The Good is the most final of all ends and the centre of all desirable natures

       You must not, however, suppose that this generation and progression is emitted in consequence of The Good either being moved, or multiplied, or possessing a generative power, or energizing; since all these are secondary to the singleness of the first. For whether The Good is moved, it will not be The Good; since The Good Itself, and which is nothing else, if it were moved would depart from goodness. 
       How, therefore, can that which is the source of goodness to beings, produce other things when deprived of good? 
       Or whether The Good is multiplied through imbecility, there will be a progression of the whole of things through a diminution, but not through an abundance of goodness. For that which in generating departs from its proper transcendency, hastens to adorn inferior natures, not through prolific perfection, but through a diminution and want of its own power. But if The Good produces all things by employing power, there will be a diminution of goodness about it. For it will be two things and not one, viz. it will be good and power. And if indeed it is in want of power, that which is primarily good will be indigent. 
       But if to be The Good Itself is sufficient to the perfection of the things produced, and to the plenitude of all things, why do we assume power as an addition? 
       For additions in the Gods are ablations of transcendent unions. Let The Good therefore alone be prior to power, and prior to energy. For all energy is the progeny of power. Neither, therefore, does The Good energizing give subsistence to all things through energy, nor being in want of power does it fill all things with powers, nor being multiplied do all things participate of good, nor being moved do all beings enjoy the first principle. 
       For The Good precedes all powers, and all energies, and every multitude and motion; since each of these is referred to The Good as to its end. The Good therefore is the most final of all ends, and the centre of all desirable natures. All desirable natures, indeed, impart an end to secondary beings; but that which pre-subsists uncircumscribed by all things is the first good. 

    Let us now in perfect quiet approach near to the cause of all things

       Let us now therefore, if ever, abandon multiform knowledge, exterminate from ourselves all the variety of life, and in perfect quiet approach near to the cause of all things. 
       For this purpose, let not only opinion and phantasy be at rest, nor the passions alone which impede our anagogic impulse to the first, be at peace; but let the air be still, and the universe itself be still. 
       And let all things extend us with a tranquil power to communion with the ineffable. 
       Let us also, standing there, having transcended the intelligible (if we contain any thing of this kind,) and with nearly closed eyes adoring as it were the rising sun, since it is not lawful for any being whatever intently to behold him - let us survey the sun whence the light of the intelligible Gods proceeds, emerging, as the poets say, from the bosom of the ocean; and again from this divine tranquillity descending into intellect, and from intellect, employing the reasonings of the soul, let us relate to ourselves what the natures are from which, in this progression, we shall consider the first God as exempt. 
     

    The Good
     intelligible Gods
     intellect
    the reasonings
    of the soul
    Descending from The Good into the reasonings of the soul

       And let us as it were celebrate him, not as establishing the earth and the heavens, nor as giving subsistence to souls, and the generations of all animals; for he produced these indeed, but among the last of things; but, prior to these, let us celebrate him as unfolding into light the whole intelligible and intellectual genus of Gods, together with all the supermundane and mundane divinities - as the God of all Gods, the unity of all unities, and beyond the first adyta, - as more ineffable than all silence, and more unknown than all essence, - as holy among the holies, and concealed in the intelligible Gods. 
       And again after these things descending into a reasoning process from an intellectual hymn, and employing the irreprehensible science of dialectic, let us, following the contemplation of first causes, survey the manner in which the first God is exempt from the whole of things. And let our descent be as far as to this. 
       But opinion and phantasy and sense, prevent us indeed from partaking of the presence of the Gods, and draw us down from Olympian goods to earth-born motions, Titannically divide the intellect that is in us, and divulse us from an establishment in wholes to the images of beings. 

    The Theology of Plato
    Proclus
    Excepts from Book II, chapters VII and XI
    Translated by Thomas Taylor
    isbn 1 898910 07 3

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