T h e T h e o l o g
y o f P l a t o
b y P
r o c l u s
T H E F I R S T
P R I N C I P L E
The twofold division to all things
If, however, it be requisite to survey
each of the dogmas about it which are scattered in the writings of Plato,
and to reduce them to one science of theology, let us consider, if you
are willing, prior to other things, what Socrates demonstrates in the 6th
book of the Republic, conformably to the before mentioned mode, and how
through analogy he teaches us the wonderful transcendency of The Good with
respect to all beings, and the summits of the whole of things.
In the first place therefore, he
distinguishes beings from each other, and establishing some of them to
be intelligibles, but others sensibles, he defines science by the knowledge
of beings.
intelligible beings
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sensible beings
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Science is the knowledge of intelligible and sensible beings
But he conjoins sense with sensibles,
and giving a twofold division to all things, he places one exempt monad
over intelligible multitude, and a second monad over sensible multitude,
according to a similitude to the former monad.
intelligible monad
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intelligible multitude
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sensible monad
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sensible multitude
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The twofold division to all things
Of these monads also, he shows that
the one is generative of intelligible light, but the other of sensible
light.
intelligible monad
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generative of
intelligible light
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intelligible multitude
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sensible monad
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generative of
sensible light
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sensible multitude
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|
Both monads are generative of light
And he evinces that by the intelligible
light indeed, all intelligibles are deiform, and boniform, according to
participation from the first God; but that by the sensible light, according
to the perfection derived from the sun, all sensible natures are solarform,
and similar to their one monad.
intelligible monad
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|
intelligible multitude
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all intelligibles are deiform and boniform
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sensible monad
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|
sensible multitude
|
all sensible natures are solarform
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Each nature is similar to their one monad
In addition also to what has been
said, he suspends the second monad from that which reigns in the intelligible.
And thus he extends all things, both the first and the last of beings,
I mean intelligibles and sensibles, to The Good.
The Good = intelligible monad
|
intelligible multitude
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the sun = sensible monad
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sensible multitude
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All things are extended to The Good
Such a mode of reduction to the first
as this, appears to me to be most excellent, and especially adapted to
theology; viz. to congregate all the Gods in the world into one union,
and suspend them from their proximate monad; but to refer the supermundane
Gods to the intellectual kingdom; to suspend the intellectual Gods from
intelligible union; and to refer the intelligible Gods themselves, and
all beings through these, to that which is first.
intelligible kingdom
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intelligible monad
|
intelligible Gods
|
intellectual kingdom
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intellectual monad
|
intellectual Gods
|
supermundane kingdom
|
supermundane monad
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supermundane Gods
|
mundane kingdom
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mundane monad
|
mundane Gods
|
For as the monad of mundane natures
is supermundane, as the monad of supermundane natures is intellectual,
and of intellectual natures intelligible, thus also it is necessary that
first intelligibles should be suspended from the monad which is above intelligibles
and perfected by it, and being filled with deity, should illuminate secondary
natures with intelligible light.
But it is necessary that intellectual
natures which derive the enjoyment of their being from intelligibles, but
of good and a uniform hyparxis from the first cause, should connect supermundane
natures by intellectual light. And that the genera of the Gods prior to
the world, through receiving a pure intellect from the intellectual Gods,
but intelligible light from the intelligible Gods, and a unical light from
the father of the whole of things, should send into this apparent world
the illumination of the light which they possess.
In this account, the sun being the
summit of mundane natures, and proceeding from the etherial profundities,
imparts to visible natures supernatural perfection, and causes these as
much as possible to be similar to the supercelestial worlds. These things
therefore we shall afterwards more abundantly discuss.
What is sensible is splendid because it imitates the primogenial
cause of itself
The present discourse, however, suspends
all things after the above mentioned manner from The Good, and the first
unity. For if indeed the sun connects every thing sensible, but The Good
produces and perfects every thing intelligible, and of these, the second
monad [i. e. the sun] is denominated the offspring of The Good and on this
account causes that which is sensible to be splendid, and adorns and fills
it with good, because it imitates the primogenial cause of itself, - if
this be the case, all things will thus participate of the good, and will
be extended to this one principle, intelligibles indeed, and the most divine
of beings without a medium, but sensibles through their monad [the sun].
Some things are intelligibles and others are sensibles, but
the summits of them are uniformly established in intelligibles
Again therefore, and after another
manner, Plato narrates to us in this extract from the Republic the analysis
to the first principle. For he suspends all the multitudes in the world
from the intelligible monads, as for instance, all beautiful things from
the beautiful itself, all good things from The Good, and all equal things
from the equal itself. And again, he considers some things as intelligibles,
but others as sensibles; but the summits of them are uniformly established
in intelligibles.
intelligibles
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the beautiful itself
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The Good
|
the equal itself
|
sensibles
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all beautiful things
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all good things
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all equal things
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All the multitudes in the world are suspended from the
intelligible monads
Again, from these intelligible forms
he thinks fit to ascend still higher, and venerating in a greater degree
the goodness which is beyond intelligibles, he apprehends that all intelligibles,
and the monads which they contain, subsist and are perfected through it.
For as we refer the sensible multitude to a monad unco-ordinated with sensibles,
and we think that through this monad the multitude of sensibles derives
its subsistence, so it is necessary to refer the intelligible multitude
to another cause which is not connumerated with intelligibles, and from
which they are allotted their essence and their divine hyparxis.
The first good is not only the cause of what is good, but similarly
of things beautiful
Let not, however, any one fancy that
Plato admits there is the same order of The Good in intelligible forms,
as there is prior to intelligibles. But the good indeed, which is co-ordinated
with the beautiful, must be considered as essential, and as one of the
forms which are in intelligibles.
|
The Good
|
intelligibles
|
the beautiful itself
|
the good itself
|
sensibles
|
all beautiful things
|
all good things
|
There is not the same order of The Good in intelligible
forms
For the first good, which by conjoining
the article with the noun we are accustomed to call The Good, is admitted
to be something superessential, and more excellent than all beings both
in dignity and power; since Socrates also, when discussing the beautiful
and the good, calls the one the beautiful itself and the other the good
itself, and thus says he we must denominate all the things which we then
very properly considered as many.
Again, particularly considering each
thing as being one, we denominate each thing that which it is, and thus
Socrates leading us from sensible things that are beautiful and good, and
in short from things that are participated, subsist in other things, and
are multiplied, to the superessential unities of intelligibles and the
first essences, from these again, he transfers us to the exempt cause of
every thing beautiful and good.
For in forms, the beautiful itself
is the leader of many beautiful things, and the good itself of many goods,
and each form alone gives subsistence to things similar to itself. But
the first good is not only the cause of what is good, but similarly of
things beautiful, as Plato elsewhere says; and "all things are for its
sake, and it is the cause of every thing beautiful."
The Good prior to forms is beyond beings, and is established
above all knowledge
For again, in addition to what has
been said, the good which is in forms is intelligible and known, as Socrates
himself teaches; but The Good prior to forms is beyond beings, and is established
above all knowledge. And the former is the source of essential perfection;
but the latter is the supplier of good to the Gods so far as they are Gods,
and is generative of goods which are prior to essences.
The Good
prior to forms
|
is beyond beings
|
is established above all knowledge
|
is generative of goods which are prior to essences
|
the good
which is in forms
|
is intelligible
|
is known
|
is the source of essential perfection
|
We must not therefore apprehend that
when Socrates calls the first principle The Good, from the name of idea,
that he directly calls it the intelligible goodness; but though the first
principle is superior to all language and appellation, we permit Socrates
to call it the cause of every thing beautiful and good, transferring through
the things which are proximately filled by it, appellations to it.
For this I think Socrates indicating
asserts in all that he says about The Good, that it is beyond knowledge
and things that are known, and likewise beyond essence and being, according
to its analogy to the sun. And after a certain admirable manner he presents
us with an epitome of the negations of The One in the Parmenides.
For the assertion that The Good is
neither truth, nor essence, nor intellect, nor science, at one and the
same time separates it from the superessential unities, and every genus
of the Gods, and from the intellectual and intelligible orders, and from
every psychical subsistence. But these are the first things, and through
the first hypothesis of the Parmenides, these are taken away from the principle
of the whole of things.
The first light proceeds from The Good as the fountain of every
intelligible, or intellectual, or mundane deity
Moreover, neither when he celebrates
The Good the leader of the divine orders, as the most splendid of being,
does he denominate it most splendid as participating of light. For the
first light proceeds from it to intelligibles and intellect, but he gives
it this appellation as the cause of the light which is every where diffused,
and as the fountain of every intelligible, or intellectual, or mundane
deity.
The Good
|
intelligible Gods
|
intellectual Gods
|
mundane Gods
|
The Good is the leader of the divine orders
For this light is nothing else than
the participation of a divine hyparxis. For as all things become boniform
through participating of The Good and are filled with the illumination
proceeding from thence, thus also the natures which are primarily beings
are deiform; and as it is said, intelligible and intellectual essences
become divine through the participation of deity.
Looking therefore to all that has
been said, we shall preserve the exempt transcendency of The Good with
reference to all beings and the divine orders. But again, in each order
of beings, we must grant that there is a monad analogous to it, not only
in sensibles, as Plato says the sun is, but likewise in supermundane natures,
and in the genera of Gods arranged from The Good prior to these.
intelligible order
|
The Good
|
intelligible Gods
|
intellectual order
|
intellectual monad
|
intellectual Gods
|
supermundane order
|
supermundane monad
|
supermundane Gods
|
mundane order
|
mundane monad
|
mundane Gods
|
In each order of beings there is a monad
For it is evident that the natures
which are nearer to the first cause and which participate of it in a greater
degree, possess a greater similitude to it. And as that is the cause of
all beings, so these establish monads which are the leaders of more partial
orders. And Plato indeed arranges the multitudes under the monads; but
extends all the monads to the exempt principle of the whole of things,
and establishes them uniformly about it.
It is necessary therefore that the
theological science should be unfolded conformably to the divine orders,
and that our conceptions about it should be transcendent, and unmingled
and unconnected with other things. And we should survey indeed all secondary
natures, subsisting according to and perfected about it; but we should
establish it as transcending all the monads in beings, according to one
excess of simplicity, and as unically arranged prior to the whole orders
[of Gods.] For as the Gods themselves enact the order which is in them,
thus also it is necessary that the truth concerning them, the precedaneous
causes of beings, and the second and third progeny of these should be definitely
distinguished.
The first principle gives subsistence to the boniform essence
of the Gods
This, therefore, is the one truth
concerning the first principle, and which possesses one reason remarkably
conformable to the Platonic hypothesis, viz. that this principle subsists
prior to the whole orders in the Gods, that it gives subsistence to the
boniform essence of the Gods, that it is the fountain of superessential
goodness, and that all things posterior to it being extended towards it,
are filled with good, after an ineffable manner are united to it, and subsist
uniformly about it.
the first principle
|
subsists prior to the whole orders in the Gods |
gives subsistence to the boniform essence of the Gods |
is the fountain of superessential goodness |
all things posterior to it being extended towards it, are filled with
good, after an ineffable manner are united to it, and subsist uniformly
about it |
The one truth concerning the first principle
For its unical nature is not unprolific,
but it is by so much the more generative of other things, as it pre-establishes
a union exempt from the things which have a subsistence. Nor does its fecundity
tend to multitude and division; but it abides with undefiled purity concealed
in inaccessible places. For in the natures also which are posterior to
it, we every where see that what is perfect desires to generate, and that
what is full hastens to impart to other things its plenitude.
In a much greater degree therefore
it is necessary that the nature which contains in one all perfections,
and which is not a certain good, but good itself, and super-full, (if it
be lawful so to speak) should be generative of the whole of things, and
give subsistence to them; producing all things by being exempt from all
things, and by being imparticipable, similarly generating the first and
the last of beings.
The Good is the most final of all ends and the centre of all
desirable natures
You must not, however, suppose that
this generation and progression is emitted in consequence of The Good either
being moved, or multiplied, or possessing a generative power, or energizing;
since all these are secondary to the singleness of the first. For whether
The Good is moved, it will not be The Good; since The Good Itself, and
which is nothing else, if it were moved would depart from goodness.
How, therefore, can that which is
the source of goodness to beings, produce other things when deprived of
good?
Or whether The Good is multiplied
through imbecility, there will be a progression of the whole of things
through a diminution, but not through an abundance of goodness. For that
which in generating departs from its proper transcendency, hastens to adorn
inferior natures, not through prolific perfection, but through a diminution
and want of its own power. But if The Good produces all things by employing
power, there will be a diminution of goodness about it. For it will be
two things and not one, viz. it will be good and power. And if indeed it
is in want of power, that which is primarily good will be indigent.
But if to be The Good Itself is sufficient
to the perfection of the things produced, and to the plenitude of all things,
why do we assume power as an addition?
For additions in the Gods are ablations
of transcendent unions. Let The Good therefore alone be prior to power,
and prior to energy. For all energy is the progeny of power. Neither, therefore,
does The Good energizing give subsistence to all things through energy,
nor being in want of power does it fill all things with powers, nor being
multiplied do all things participate of good, nor being moved do all beings
enjoy the first principle.
For The Good precedes all powers,
and all energies, and every multitude and motion; since each of these is
referred to The Good as to its end. The Good therefore is the most final
of all ends, and the centre of all desirable natures. All desirable natures,
indeed, impart an end to secondary beings; but that which pre-subsists
uncircumscribed by all things is the first good.
Let us now in perfect quiet approach near to the cause of all
things
Let us now therefore, if ever, abandon
multiform knowledge, exterminate from ourselves all the variety of life,
and in perfect quiet approach near to the cause of all things.
For this purpose, let not only opinion
and phantasy be at rest, nor the passions alone which impede our anagogic
impulse to the first, be at peace; but let the air be still, and the universe
itself be still.
And let all things extend us with
a tranquil power to communion with the ineffable.
Let us also, standing there, having
transcended the intelligible (if we contain any thing of this kind,) and
with nearly closed eyes adoring as it were the rising sun, since it is
not lawful for any being whatever intently to behold him - let us survey
the sun whence the light of the intelligible Gods proceeds, emerging, as
the poets say, from the bosom of the ocean; and again from this divine
tranquillity descending into intellect, and from intellect, employing the
reasonings of the soul, let us relate to ourselves what the natures are
from which, in this progression, we shall consider the first God as exempt.
The Good
|
intelligible Gods
|
intellect
|
the reasonings
of the soul
|
Descending from The Good into the reasonings of the soul
And let us as it were celebrate him,
not as establishing the earth and the heavens, nor as giving subsistence
to souls, and the generations of all animals; for he produced these indeed,
but among the last of things; but, prior to these, let us celebrate him
as unfolding into light the whole intelligible and intellectual genus of
Gods, together with all the supermundane and mundane divinities - as the
God of all Gods, the unity of all unities, and beyond the first adyta,
- as more ineffable than all silence, and more unknown than all essence,
- as holy among the holies, and concealed in the intelligible Gods.
And again after these things descending
into a reasoning process from an intellectual hymn, and employing the irreprehensible
science of dialectic, let us, following the contemplation of first causes,
survey the manner in which the first God is exempt from the whole of things.
And let our descent be as far as to this.
But opinion and phantasy and sense,
prevent us indeed from partaking of the presence of the Gods, and draw
us down from Olympian goods to earth-born motions, Titannically divide
the intellect that is in us, and divulse us from an establishment in wholes
to the images of beings.
The Theology of Plato
Proclus
Excepts from Book II, chapters VII and XI
Translated by Thomas Taylor
isbn 1 898910 07 3
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